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In light of the COVID-19 world-wide pandemic, the need for secure and readily
available remote patient monitoring has never been more important. Rural and
low income communities in particular have been severely impacted by the lack of
accessibility to in-person healthcare. This has created the need for access to
remote patient monitoring and virtual health visits in order for greater
accessibility to premier care. In this paper, we propose hardware security
primitives as a viable solution to meet the security challenges of the telehealth
market. We have created a novel solution, called the High-Low (HiLo) method,
that generates physical unclonable function (PUF) signatures based on process
variation within flash memory in order to uniquely identify and authenticate
remote sensors. The HiLo method consumes 20x less power than conventional
authentication schemes, has an average latency of only 39ms for signature
generation, and can be readily implemented through firmware on ONFI 2.2
compliant off-the-shelf NAND flash memory chips. The HiLo method generates
512 bit signatures with an average error rate of 5.9 * 10-4, while also adapting for
flash chip aging. Due to its low latency, low error rate, and high power efficiency,
we believe that the HiLo method could help progress the field of remote patient
monitoring by accurately and efficiently authenticating remote health sensors.
Keywords: Process Variation, Hardware Security, PUF, Sensor Authentication
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION
Section 1.1 - What is Telehealth?
Telecommunication in healthcare, or telehealth, provides a means by which
patients can interact with medical professionals and health-related services
virtually. It serves as a resource for patients to help them manage their health and
receive the healthcare that they need. One service of telehealth is remote patient
monitoring, which allows a healthcare provider to track patient data such as body
temperature, heart rate, and blood glucose levels. This technology helps patients
stay informed about the status of their health with the added convenience of being
remote, and gives physicians a pow
.erful tool to help them diagnose, treat, and manage their patients' conditions.
The demand for telehealth has grown substantially in light of the COVID-19
pandemic, which has disrupted the delivery of healthcare on a global scale. In
2020 alone, the telehealth market experienced a year-over-year increase of 64.3
percent, and is estimated to grow seven-fold by 2025 [11]. However, the
convenience of connecting medical providers with patients remotely also
introduces significant security and privacy risks. One such risk of using unsecured
medical devices is the potential for a major privacy breach, as they store sensitive
information such as vital signals, diagnosed conditions, therapies, and a variety of
other personal data [3].
Developing a reliable process for authenticating health sensors will ensure that
private health information is only sent when authorized devices request it.
Security vulnerabilities could expose private and sensitive information of patients
to attackers, and it could be used to access critical backend systems of a supplier
or a healthcare provider. This protection of user data allows for the proper
expanse of telehealth systems without compromising patient data and
guaranteeing device security.
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Section 1.2 - Project Goals
At the start of this project, we set out to create a faster, more secure, and more
efficient form of telehealth authentication. In order to accomplish this hefty
project, there were many intermediary goals that needed to be addressed
throughout the year. The main objectives of this project include:
● Developing MLC Flash NAND Chip memory controller software for
ONFI 2.2 compatible chipsets.
● Develop a PUF extraction method that can be used to generate secure keys
using process variations found on flash memory chips.
● Verify the extracted PUF’s integrity through statistical analysis and
reliability testing.
● Propose a novel secure handshaking protocol for health sensors that
implements the proposed PUF extraction method.
Refer to Appendix A for more information regarding the project’s schedule and
deadlines pertaining to each of these project objectives.
Section 1.3 - Contributions
At the completion of our project, we have completed all proposed project goals
listed in section 1.2. In summary, we have contributed the following:
● We have built a novel PUF extraction technique, called the HiLo method,
which supports edge deployment on low cost microcontrollers. This will
lower the cost of entry, and encourage secure data transmission for remote
devices.
● The  proposed  HiLo  method  offers  a  PUF  solution for accurate
authentication, and has lower latency and lower power consumption  than
other  PUF  generation  techniques.
● The HiLo method is compatible with off-the-shelf ONFI 2.2 compliant
flash chips, which could lead to backwards compatibility implementation
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on existing health sensors.
The following section will explore the preliminary information required in order
to fully understand our design implementation.
3
CHAPTER 2 - PRELIMINARY INFORMATION
Section 2.1 - Wireless Authentication Methods
There are a variety of wireless authentication methods that are used by IoT and
Telehealth devices. One of the most common ways to authenticate these resource
constrained devices is by utilizing pre-shared keys. Pre-shared keys are
authentication keys or tokens that are shared with a device prior to its deployment.
These keys are then exchanged with a gateway in order to authenticate an IoT
device. There are several important vulnerabilities within this model that our
solution addresses. First, the keys can be extracted out of firmware by a
sophisticated hacker who has access to the physical device. This has happened in
the industry with Link Plugs and other smaller IoT devices [27]. Secondly, these
keys can be cloned through replay attacks and deauthentication attacks [7]. This
was shown to be effective on all WEP Wifi routers which extracted wifi keys due
to the lack of 'freshness' in the messages sent between endpoints and Wifi routers.
By using PUFs and TRNGs, many of these prior security vulnerabilities can be
drastically mitigated by providing random nonces and authentication signatures.
Firstly, the PUFs allow secrets to be embedded in process variations which are not
stored in any nonvolatile memory; this prevents hackers from simply dumping
onboard firmware and finding pre-shared keys. Secondly, the onboard TRNG
mitigates replay attacks by preventing attackers from arbitrarily replaying
authentication messages.
Section 2.2 - MLC NAND Flash Memory Architecture
Flash  NAND memory is a type of non-volatile memory that stores user data in
the physical form of charge on a float gate. Programming these cells requires
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electrons to move from the polysilicon channel on/off the float gate via electron
tunnelling, described  in Figure 2.1A.  It is important to note that this  electron
tunneling  can  damage  the  tunnel oxide, which means that flash cells become
less reliable after many program/erase  cycles  (PECs). Most  flash  memory  is
rated anywhere from 1,000 to 10,000 PECs. A flash’s lifetime can increase
drastically by using a memory management controller that   distributes   PECs
evenly across all cells called wear leveling.
Figure 2.1 A-B: Flash Memory Architecture
In  the  case  of Multi-Level  Cell  (MLC) flash chips, 2 bits of data are stored on
each cell, where the current float gate voltage is compared to multiple threshold
voltages in order to determine the cell’s digital value, as shown in Figure 2.1B.
Thanks to its high memory density, low cost, and ability to be programmed and
erased electronically without moving parts, flash NAND memory has exploded in
popularity for remote devices and IoT systems [6].
Section 2.3 - Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs)
Integrated chips have random sub-micron process variations that are caused from
the natural manufacturing process. These variations include slight differences in
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transistor sizes, resistors, and other onboard components in an integrated chip.
These variations must be accounted for and mitigated in the design process;
however, researchers have proposed using these variations to produce bit strings
that can uniquely identify chips based on the uniqueness of their process
variations. This effectively creates a silicon “fingerprint” that depends on
submicron variations that are extremely difficult to model. The first silicon PUFs
were introduced from Pappu et al. [13,14] and Gassend et al. [1] in 2002. There
are two imperative characteristics necessary for a PUF to function. A PUF must
have both random and uncontrollable variations. This guarantees that a third party
cannot clone or predict a PUF’s functionality. Furthermore, PUF’s must have
satisfactory uniqueness, reliability, and randomness. Uniqueness guarantees that
each response from a PUF system is unique from another. Reliability emphasizes
that a PUF’s response must be consistent for a given challenge. Finally, the
randomness highlights the necessary randomness between response bits.
There are many different types of PUFs such as Arbiter PUFs (APUFs), Static
Random Memory PUFs (SRAM PUFs), XOR Arbiter PUFs (XAPUFs), Dynamic
Random Access Memory PUFs (DRAM PUFs), and Flash Memory PUFs
(FPUFs). Regardless of the type of PUF, PUFs can be utilized in a variety of
cryptographic applications, as evidenced by their use in authentication schemes
[22], software attestation [8], IC counterfeiting [15], and cryptographic key
generation [2]. PUFs provide a unique advantage of tying cryptographic security
primitives to the process variations that significantly reduces both performance
and hardware costs while also providing strong cryptographic security.
Section 2.4 - Process Variations and PUFs for Flash Memory
Like all other silicon based ICs, flash memory chips are subject to many different
forms of process variations. In general, most process variations are uncontrollable
imperfections caused by limitations in modern lithography processes. These
variations are commonly caused by various disturbs from Random Dopant
Fluctuations (RDP). RDP fluctuations can be temporarily induced through
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standard programming calls that comply with the ONFI NAND Flash interface
allowing them to be extractable on any ONFI compliant memory chip.  This gives
a significant advantage compared to other memory architectures where PUF cells
cannot be extracted through a standardized process using accessible programming
techniques.
Several different disturbs can be implemented through these standard
programming techniques such as Read disturb, program disturb, program/erase
latency, and Random Telegraph Noise (RTN). Read disturb causes subtle
increases on the threshold voltages of neighboring cells on the same flash page.
Over time, this slowly changes the logical bit values of the cells to induce errors
that depend on each cell’s relative oxide and gate thickness.
Figure 2.2: Flash Memory Read Disturb
A similar error is the program disturb. The program disturb occurs
due to the increase of the gating voltage required for a program operation [6].
Since the programming requires a higher voltage on the gate line, it introduces
parasitic capacitance that causes a shift in the threshold voltage of neighboring
cells. This is highlighted in Figure 2.3.
7
Figure 2.3: Flash Memory Program Disturb
The next technique for extracting process variations is the program/erase interrupt
scheme. In this scheme A program or erase command is issued to a page or block.
This command is then abruptly interrupted leaving the cells in an unsteady and
ambiguous state. Therefore, minimal differences in the oxide thickness of
individual gates causes different read values in the cells. This technique is very
effective at generating PUF signatures; however, it can be susceptible to various
sources of noise.
Figure 2.4: Flash Memory Program Interrupt
Finally, one other technique can be used for process variation extraction in Flash
PUFs. The latency of program/erase operations can be digitized and also used for
PUFs. However, this technique is drastically limited in its throughput.
Ultimately each technique causes fluctuations that depend on each cell's relative
gate thickness and width. both of which are uncontrollable and extremely hard to
model. Finally, this allows for unique signatures that can be generated for each
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page of the flash memory. These PUFs can be used for secure key generation and
authentication mechanisms [26]. Each PUF has a challenge and response. The
challenge is the input to the unclonable function which then outputs a response.
This response has high security and differs from each subsequent response and
challenge pair.
Section 2.5 - Prior State of the Art Flash PUFs
When looking at the development of different Flash PUFs there are several
important trends to recognize. The first Flash PUFs were created from 2012-2017
[17, 22, 9, 18]. These seminal works were predominantly focused on showing
how Flash memory was a viable candidate for memory-based PUFs. These Flash
PUFs were important for showing the promise of flash memory, but they
struggled to account for several factors such as aging, temperature, and design
constraints. For example, Prabhu et al. [17] required hundreds of thousands of
programs in order for PUF signatures to develop which can take several hours.
Similarly, Kim et al. [10] required very fine grained flash programming which
required knowledge of sensing voltages that is typically proprietary on
commercial flash chips. Similarly, Wang et al. [22] created both a novel PUF and
TRNG but incurred very high processing overheads that led to high latency.
From 2018 to 2020, a second phase of Flash PUF development began marked by
the work of [7, 12, 15, 16, 19, 20, 24]. Many of these proposed designs
significantly enhanced PUF designs that took into account many different factors.
These Flash PUFs incorporate advanced parameters such as aging resistance,
temperature resistance, and unique architectures. For example, work from Clark
et. al [7] designed a Flash PUF that was voltage resistant. Secondly, Poudel et. al
[15,16] designed a Flash PUF that works on the onboard microcontroller NOR
Flash Memory. Similarly, Larimian et. al [20] verified the machine learning
resilience of their Flash based PUFs by performing extensive deep learning tests.
Finally, Mahmoodi et. al [12] created one of the most stable and resilient Flash
PUFs by modifying the cells to extract leakage current.
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However, this second phase of development also has several design difficulties. In
order to make PUFs commercially viable, they must be generated using cheap
commercial microcontrollers in order to keep their price point down. Furthermore,
it is helpful that these PUFs can be deployed on legacy systems by using
commercial off the shelf flash memory and these systems must avoid excessively
long latency that have been seen in works such as [20]. Many of the previous
work from the second phase does not use commercial off the shelf components.
This can reduce the adoption of Flash PUF technology. Secondly, many of these
Flash PUFs require slowly building charge differences on the floating gate
through hundreds or thousands of program/erase cycles. This is effective at
generating signatures; however, this drastically increases latency required to
generate these signatures. Finally, many of the systems that avoid the slow build
up of charge have to use expensive FPGAs with Gigahertz clocking speeds to
generate fine grained interrupts as shown in Clark [7]. This is not viable for edge
deployments particularly those such as telehealth based applications.
Our work, seeks to bridge this gap by developing a Flash based PUF that uses
only ONFI standard commands, works on a 15 dollar microcontroller, uses off the
shelf commodity flash chips, generates signatures with low latency using a novel
interrupt technique, and is able to compete with some of the most resilient PUF
structures that were highlighted from the second phase of development.
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CHAPTER 3 - PROJECT PLAN AND METHODOLOGY
Section 3.1 - Project Plan
1. Fall Quarter
• Compiled research on PUFs and looked at potential Telehealth
Applications
• Developed a memory controller software to read and write to the MLC
Flash NAND Chip
• Created our telehealth application using a temperature sensor and a
Raspberry Pi
2. Winter Quarter
• Finalized a PUF extraction method that can be used to generate secure
keys
• Built a TCP/IP handshaking protocol to connect and send data between
two Raspberry Pis on different networks
2. Spring Quarter
• Verified the PUF’s reliability and randomness with statistical NIST
testing
• Implemented dynamic authentication protocol utilizing challenges and
responses from the PUF
Section 3.2 - Methodology
3.2.1 Tools Used
Many of the decisions regarding tools and methodology were direct consequences
of the remote nature of this year’s projects. With no guaranteed time to
collaborate in person or share experimental setups, it was vital to create an easily
accessible project that could be changed by all team members on the fly. The tools
used for the project include:
Google Suite - All written documentation and results were stored using Google
Suite Applications including docs and sheets. This allowed us to
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actively collaborate without the need of in-person meetings.
MBed - MBed was the main resource for all project firmware development. The
resource allowed us to build useful firmware that was updated in real time
through code pushes. It also allowed us to fork projects and experiment
with the setup individually without excessive version control. More
information regarding project firmware can be found in Appendix B.
Jupyter Notebook - The final resource required was a program to effectively
process and visualize the data being collected. We chose Python-based
analysis using Jupyter Notebook in order to analyze and process complex
and large data sets.
While many different tools and programs could yield similar results, we believe
that our tools and methodology were effective and useful for a remote work
environment.
12
CHAPTER 4 - HILO FLASH PUF EXTRACTION TECHNIQUE
Section 4.1 - Design Considerations
With the experimental setup described in the previous section, work started on the
PUF extraction method itself. When designing the PUF extraction method, there
were two major metrics that were focused on extensively. The first feature was
minimizing the number of program/erase cycles (PECs) required in order to
extract a reliable signature. As mentioned in Section 2.2, flash memory devices
have a limited lifetime measured in PECs. As charge is tunneled onto and off of
the float gate, the tunnel oxide that separates the silicon channel and the float gate
begins to deteriorate. As the deterioration continues, the data held within each cell
becomes unreliable due to the increase of charge leakage on the float gate. Wear
on the cells is an issue for data retention and general application use, but it also
poses an issue with unreliable signature extraction, because the programming and
erase times for each cell are altered as the cell reaches its end of life. In order to
combat this aging effect, HiLo was designed in order to require as few PECs as
possible.
The second major consideration was lowering the signature extraction latency.
Faster signature extractions allow for faster authentication and lower power
consumption. Telehealth sensors in the scope of this work can be treated as edge
devices that are resource constrained by both processor speed as well as limited
battery life. In order to prolong the sensor's battery lifetime as well as create a
reasonably fast authenticated connection, the method needs to be lightweight and
fast.
While additional results and metrics will be discussed in detail in Section 5.1,
these two design considerations helped guide many of the design decisions for the
HiLo method. In the next section the HiLo technique will be explained in detail,
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and additional design constraints and considerations will be discussed.
Section 4.2 - Experimental Setup
As mentioned in our summarization of contributions section, it was vital to keep
the experimental setup as minimal as possible in terms of both cost and
complexity. While previous works have mostly required high clock frequencies
and custom chips, our novel design uses a 100 MHz clock and a simple TSOP
Adapter in order to connect to the flash chip. Our simple bill of materials consists
of:
● STM32 based microcontroller with 100 MHz maximum clocking
frequency. This will serve as the memory controller and is used to
read/write/erase the flash memory.
● 32 GB MLC Flash NAND memory chip from Micron that does not have
an integrated memory controller. The memory chip can read/store
application data and is also used in the HiLo extraction method
● TSOP Adapter in order to interact with packaged flash NAND chip
The entire experimental setup was purchased for just shy of $20, and all items
were readily available for purchase to be included in commercial application. It is
worth noting that we used an unmanaged flash chip in order to give us full control
of the device. This extra control allowed us to write directly to specific memory
locations without worrying about wear-leveling control or error correcting code
(ECC), which are implemented in most managed flash components. This gave us
the highest control on interrupting the writing, erasing, and reading processes,
because we were directly controlling the chip's behavior without interference
from the memory controller. While a commercial application will require ECC
and wear leveling in its memory controller software, this setup shows that the
HiLo extraction method could be readily added to current memory controller
solutions through a minor software modification.
While unmanaged flash gives extra control over the memory's behavior, it also
requires a more detailed communication protocol. Most commercial managed
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flash uses SPI or I2C protocols in order to access basic functionalities. On the
other hand, unmanaged flash requires a version of open NAND flash interface
protocol (ONFI). Specifically, HiLo was tested using ONFI version 2.2, which
requires 7 digital control signals and an 8 bit bus for reading and writing data. The
HiLo method only requires the most basic memory access and modification
functions including read page, write page, and erase block. The interrupt sequence
and reading of data is ubiquitous across all ONFI 2.2 memory chips. The flash
chip tested in this work stores pages consisting of 4096 bytes of data and 224
extra bytes for ECC. Blocks are organized in chunks of 256 pages, with each 32
Gb chip having access to 4096 unique blocks. In order to read and verify data,
flash memory values were sent from the microcontroller to a terminal window on
a laptop via UART communication using a USB connection.This was also the
method used for storing and analysing large sample sizes of data in .csv formats.
Section 4.3 - HiLo Extraction Method
4.3.1 - PUF Extraction Observations and Techniques
For our PUF to be viable, the PUF extraction must have low latency and can only
use standard edge deployable microcontrollers within the 100MHz frequency
range. This introduces several important design challenges in order to make Flash
PUFs achievable on low cost microcontrollers. First the low latency requirement
prevents the design from utilizing hundreds of repeated program and read cycles
that slowly increase the charge on the floating. Therefore, our scheme must use
fine grained interrupts in order to interrupt the operation of the cells to force the
flash into unsteady positions. However, a single interrupt scheme such as the one
seen in Clark et. al [7] does not have a high enough clock resolution to interrupt
the flash programming fast enough to generate a 50/50 split between ones and
zeros. In fact, signatures that are generated from a single programmed interrupt
are either about 80% 1's or 80% 0's. This is highlighted in Figure 4.3.1 where the
sysTick clock on the microcontroller is interrupted at different times. As shown in
the figure, the clock does not have the granularity to interrupt the programming
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operation on the microcontroller to generate an even distribution of 1's and 0's.
Figure 4.3.1: Ratio of 1’s and 0’s vs. Clocking Granularity
Secondly, the lack of granularity has another limiting effect as well. The
signatures generated from a single interrupt are extremely noisy. This is due to the
interrupting method. This error rate can approach 10% within 80 total P/E cycles.
This is due to the lack of granularity in the clock itself. Due to the max 100 Mhz
clocking speed, an interrupt at a particular clocking delay can vary due to the
limited frequency. This causes unintended errors for cells that are sensitive to the
interrupt. This drastic increase in error is highlighted in Figure 4.3.2.
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Figure 4.3.2: Error Increase as Number of PECs Increases
Although the error increases rapidly and the clocking speed cannot generate
signatures with 50% ones and zeros, several more insights and solutions were
generated to remedy these design challenges.
Specifically, a well-defined enrollment scheme is designed to select only the
most stable cells which can be decoded as one or zero. These can then be used for
highly stable signatures.
4.3.2 - Enrollment Scheme
As other work has shown in Poudel et. al [15, 16] unstable cells can be identified
for TRNG bits by applying several reads. These reads apply a smaller voltage to
the floating gate of the flash cells which only slightly disturbs the cells. This can
quickly identify unstable cells that are flagged during enrollment. Furthermore,
approximately 95% of these unstable bits flip within five reads. Therefore, only
applying five reads is sufficient for identifying stable cells through successive
read operations. Figure 4.3.3 highlights this observation. This figure graphically
shows all 32,000 bits on a single page. All of the yellow lines indicate a flipped
bit. Many of these bits flip within the first five reads which is an effective filtering
process for identifying stable bits.
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Figure 4.3.3: Bit Stability and Read Disturbs
Secondly, flash cell failure is highly spatially dependent. This is evidenced by
plotting a histogram of the distance between each cell flip or failure. Failures tend
to cluster in groups. This can be modeled as an exponential distribution, as shown
in Figure 4.3.4. Therefore, instead of flagging individual bits that are stable, bytes
of groups are flagged as stable and only if a byte is completely stable is it passed
through the enrollment process.
Figure 4.3.4: Histogram of Distance Between Sequential Failures
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After this technique is applied about 1500 of the 4000 bytes are extracted per
page. Approximately 800 of these extracted bytes are over 95% accurate during
testing. However, approximately 700 bytes are misidentified as stable. This
reliability histogram is shown in Figure 4.3.5.
Figure 4.3.5: Byte Stability After Enrollment
However, a slight wrinkle to the first algorithm is able to generate highly stable
PUF responses. This leads to our new enrollment strategy -- the HiLo method.
The HiLo extraction method uses a novel technique to generate highly reliable
signatures. Rather than aborting the program early and using signatures with 80%
ones, two interrupted programs are performed. One generates a signature with
80% ones and the other with approximately 20% ones and five reads are
performed after each program to eliminate non-stable bytes. In order to refine the
byte selection process, bytes that are either highly resistant to programming or
highly susceptible to over-programming are chosen. This information is captured
by selecting bytes which fully resist programming in the under-programmed
section also known as the high side and which bytes that are easily programmed
in the over-programmed section also known as the low side. If a byte group is
fully programmed in the over-programmed section and is fully under-programmed
in the under-programmed section it is also removed during the enrollment
process. This eliminates bytes that can sneak through the enrollment process and
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reduces the error by several magnitudes of 10 to around .104
4.3.3 - Challenge and Response Pairs
After the HiLo enrollment process is complete a 'map' of the stable bytes are
stored on the gateway. Each byte in the map is either extremely susceptible to
over-programming or highly resistant to it. With this information, the gateway
will request particular byte locations from the sensor for authentication.
Approximately 256 low byte locations and 256 high byte locations will be sent
along with the specific page number that is used. This comprises approximately
600 bytes of space which can be sent in the payload of a single Ethernet frame to
the sensor. The microcontroller will then apply two programs and ten total reads
and identify which bytes are stable and which are not. If a byte location produces
a majority of ones it is subsequently decoded as one and is assumed to be one of
the high side bytes. Inversely, if a byte produces a majority of zeros then it is
assumed to be from the low side and is decoded as zero. This extraction technique
can resist a maximum of three errors before a byte is incorrectly decoded.
Therefore, the gateway will receive a bit string of ones and zeros to the sensor.
This design allows for two important features for the gateway. Firstly, the gateway
can control how long of an authentication response it needs. This can allow our
application to adapt to various levels of required security. For example, certain
cryptographic applications may only require 100 bit signatures. The gateway then
only has to send 100 bytes to the sensor. On the other hand sensitive security tasks
that may demand 512 bit signatures can also be accomplished. Secondly, many
other approaches use helper data such as Hamming Codes, Fire Codes, or more
recently Low Density Parity Codes, to recover any errors sent back from the
device. These codes leak polarity information about the response values which
allows for error correction. Our scheme leaves out any polarity data and simply
sends bytes to read. This makes our helper data significantly more robust to side
channel or modeling attacks since the helper data never reveals any polarity
20
information from the bytes it is requesting. However, it is important to note that
this advantage is realized because the HiLo enrollment algorithm filters bytes
from pages very aggressively. On average, each page returns approximately 700
usable bytes. Therefore, about 83% bytes are not usable.
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CHAPTER 5 - EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND VALIDATION OF PUF
Section 5.1 - PUF Metrics
5.1.1 - Uniqueness, Randomness, and Reliability
There are three major metrics for any PUF. They are uniqueness, randomness, and
reliability. Uniqueness defines how different each PUF response is from each
other. This value is best captured through the Inter-Hamming Distance
(Inter-HD). The percentage Inter-HD describes what percentage of bits flip
between two different responses. An ideal value for this is approximately 50%.
Our system had an average of 47% which is shown in Figure 5.2.1.
Figure 5.1.1: Inter Hamming Distance Across Page Signatures
The second metric randomness describes how random each signature is. This can
be measured in Shannon entropy per bit. With 256 high bits and 256 low bits the
average Shannon entropy per bit is approximately 0.999 with an ideal value of 1.
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Next, the reliability is the final measurement. The reliability of this system is
extremely strong. The error does change as the flash cells age; however, the error
is approximately . The max error value is and the5. 9 * 10−4 7. 1 * 10−3
minimum value is . This reliability is strong enough to possibly5. 9 * 10−5
support cryptographic key generation and is able to last through the end of the
Flash's life.
5.1.2 - Aging Adaptation
In order to simulate aging, the Flash memory chips were programmed until their
maximum rating of 3,000 P/E cycles for MLC chips. The aging causes the oxide
to deteriorate from the program voltage stress. The low side bytes that are
susceptible to over programming are barely modified since these bytes just
program faster. However, the high side bytes that are resistant to programming
program more easily which modifies the amount of bit flips in each byte. In
general two approaches for this were considered. First was adapting the polling
interval and decreasing it since the flash cells program faster. However, this
approach can be difficult to model and control due to the lack of granularity in the
interrupt mechanism. Consequently, the second approach was taken. In this
approach the amount of bytes required for a decode was changed once the cells
reached a particular percentage of life used. This adapts the error rat and drops it
significantly. This is reflected in Figure 5.2.2.
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Figure 5.1.2: Error Rate Over Time With Adaptive Aging
Section 5.2 - Comparison to Current Solutions
In order to accurately evaluate the HiLo extraction method, we must also compare
our results to current solutions in industry. Currently, Tiny AES is one of the most
popular encryption schemes for resource constrained devices, and it sets a great
benchmark for comparison. Tiny AES encryption uses a pre-shared key scheme
that is similar to a PUF signature, which behaves like a physically stored key. The
Tiny AES encryption algorithm requires 22.3 mW of power, and takes 190 ms.
The HiLo extraction technique, on the other hand, takes less than a 1mW of
power and PUF signatures are generated in 34.8 ms. This shows a significant
performance advantage with a higher security guarantee since the PUF signatures
are never stored in memory. Furthermore, this low latency and power
consumption makes the HiLo PUF a strong candidate for the telehealth
application space.
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CHAPTER 6 - TELEHEALTH AUTHENTICATION
Section 6.1 - Possible Privacy Threats
Whenever a device sends data wirelessly, there is always the possibility of an
unauthorized third party attempting to steal that information. This is especially
true with healthcare data, which includes personal information, and can be used
by malicious attackers for billing fraud, identity theft, and to illegally obtain
prescription medicine. This is why according to a Trustwave report, a healthcare
data record could sell for as much as 50 times more than a stolen credit card
number on the black market [28].
The two threats we will target in our project are Man-in-the-Middle (MITM)
attacks and Replay attacks. Both sets of attacks listen in on the communication
between two hosts. With a Man in The Middle attack, the attacker intercepts the
packets being sent en route, and they can read or modify unsecured information
before it is sent off to the other host [21]. A replay attack has an attacker also read
the packets being sent between the two hosts, but the attacker uses the
authentication information to later attempt to pose as a legitimate host [21]. In an
unsecured and static authentication scheme, the attacker could simply pick up a
password being transmitted en route and use it later in a different transaction.
Section 6.2 - Proposed Secure Handshaking with HiLo Method
The first step in developing our authentication protocol was to build our telehealth
application, which involved using a DS18B20 temperature sensor to collect
temperature data and store it in a format which we can then use for edge
25
deployment. Body temperature collection is just one of the many different ways
remote patient monitoring can be utilized. For our experiment, we used a
Raspberry Pi as a means to collect temperature data in intervals of 10 seconds and
saved the data in a .csv format. To do this, we wrote a Python script to automate
the process.
We then built a TCP/IP dynamic challenge-response authentication scheme using
the PUF. This process used two Raspberry Pis, which were setup using Sockets to
communicate with each other across different networks, and the PUF extraction
device (Microcontroller, TSOP connector, MLC Flash NAND). The Raspberry Pi
that collected temperature data served as the “client”, or the health sensor.
Through USB, we connected the microcontroller to the “client” Raspberry Pi, and
then successfully interfaced the two so that the Raspberry Pi could query the
stable byte values of the NAND Flash chip. The other Raspberry Pi served as the
“gateway”, which would serve as an edge server in a real world application.
This authentication process starts with the gateway sending a challenge to the
health sensor, denoted Challenge1. This request includes a challenge location and
stable byte locations of the NAND flash memory cell. The health sensor performs
the interrupted program and extracts the stable byte values. The health sensor then
randomly generates a nonce, denoted Nonce1, and the generated hash value is
XORed with Nonce1. The value generated is sent to the gateway as a response to
Challenge1. The gateway knows what Response should be, so it XORs the entire
response of the gateway with Response1 to determine Nonce1. The gateway then
randomly generates another nonce, denoted Nonce2. A second challenge, using a
different index of stable byte locations, is generated by the gateway. Challenge2 is
then concatenated with (Response1 XOR Nonce2), and this message is sent back
to the health sensor. The health sensor is able to separate Challenge2 from
(Response1 XOR Nonce2), and (Response1 XOR Nonce2) is XORed with
Response1 to determine Nonce2. Both the gateway and the health sensor now
know the values of Challenge1, Challenge2, Nonce1, and Nonce2. Using
Challenge2, the health sensor again performs the interrupted program and extracts
the stable byte values. If the health sensor and the gateway are legitimate sources,
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the challenges and responses can be properly decoded and the transaction is
authenticated. Our proposed handshaking protocol is shown in Figure 6.2.1.
Figure 6.2.1: Authentication Protocol
There are many advantages to using this authentication scheme. First, the use of
hashes masks the plaintext values of the data being sent, meaning that attackers
won’t be able to read the data in transit. Second, the use of randomly generated
nonces means that the values being transmitted will always change with every
transaction. Finally, and most importantly, the use of a PUF provides a unique
identifier that the gateway can reliably authenticate, and attackers won’t be able to
model the authentication responses of the PUF.
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Figure 6.2.2: Challenge and Response Pairs
In Figure 6.2.2, we see the challenge and response pairs that we discussed being
sent between the health sensor and the gateway. In the event of a
man-in-the-middle or replay attack, which involves an attacker intercepting
packets between the two parties, this is the information that they would receive.
However, with regard to MITM, any modification of the packets being sent would
result in a complete breakdown of the authentication process, ultimately making it
obvious that the connection was tampered with, and would result in the gateway
refusing the connection. With Replay attacks, the use of randomly generated
nonces means the values being sent change with every transaction. This means
that an attacker can’t replay a message with an old pair of nonces, as the values
would be entirely different to the current nonces.
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CHAPTER 7 - CONCLUSION
Section 7.1 - Summary
As medical care continues to improve in both effectiveness and accessibility on a
global scale, remote patient monitoring is a logical next step for healthcare
investment. We have witnessed a global pandemic that disrupted the delivery of
potentially life-saving medical care for over a year, which may have been partially
mitigated by the adoption of remote patient monitoring (RPM) technology. While
the technology proves useful for many medical monitoring applications, it is
important to carefully consider the security vulnerabilities and possible exploits of
large scale adoption of RPM. The HiLo extraction method is a lightweight, fast,
and easily implementable security measure that could help ensure the authenticity
of RPM sensor data. The HiLo method is designed in such a way that it could be
implemented on new RPM sensors with minor software updates, and no
additional components. The method is resource efficient, and offers financial
benefits when compared with many other commercial PUF solutions.
Section 7.2 - Future Work
When considering future work for this project, more extensive testing needs to be
done using additional flash chips from different manufacturers. Additionally,
testing must be done in high temperature environments in order to verify that the
reliability remains high regardless of external factors such as heat. Finally, the
HiLo extraction method could be tested on other flash memory densities
(SLC/TLC), or possibly even different flash architectures (3-D) in order to
broaden the possible application space.
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Section 7.3 - Project Challenges and Lessons Learned
As with any year long term project, there were many challenges along the way.
The most obvious challenge was working remotely due to Covid-19. Without a
common experimental setup, getting consistent results and trustworthy data was
difficult. In order to create a uniform data collection process, all testing was done
with one experimental setup. This required one team member to perform all data
collection and testing which, depending on the data collection size, could run for a
few hours. This created a large bottleneck for data acquisition, and ultimately
slowed down every other aspect of the project.
Another challenge was trying to create highly reliable signatures. As mentioned
earlier, the enrollment process was the trickiest part of this project due to the low
granularity on our interrupt timer. To our knowledge, no other published research
has solved this granularity issue associated with a lower frequency clocked
memory controller. We were forced to experiment with many design iterations
and trials including gradient boosting, logistic regression models, forward error
correction encoding, and binning and distillation methods. No solution gave us
the 95% reliability metric that we were aiming for except for the HiLo method. It
forced us to think creatively about our project, and the lack of granularity, which
was originally thought of as a major roadblock, actually became our saving grace.
After reflecting on our team’s performance over the past year, there are many
examples of lessons learned and room for improvement. The main areas where
improvements could be made were in firmware development, data acquisition,
and team communication.
The most obvious improvement for firmware development would be moving
away from MBed and using STM32MXCube with IAR Embedded Workbench or
Keil Uvision. MBed was originally chosen for its easy version control
capabilities, but looking back we believe that GitHub could have easily been used
to accomplish the same thing. MBed abstracts quite a bit from the developer,
which is fine for a quick prototype, but for a long term project with small
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intricacies such as this one, more control would have decreased development
time. Ultimately, the firmware works as expected now, but we believe
development time could possibly have been cut by a factor of ~25% just by using
ST provided development firmware.
The second area of improvement was during the data acquisition phase. We only
had one functional experimental setup, so much of the work was forced onto one
member who could run the desired experiments. The program written to import
the collected data through a serial connection between a laptop and the
microcontroller was inefficient for the first half of the data acquisition phase.
Instead of taking the time to generalize the program used to import experimental
data, the same functions were modified in order to work for individual tests. This
meant that instead of running 5 experiments at once for 5 hours total, it required
re-running the same experiment 5 times for an hour each, which ultimately took
much longer. While initially the time investment did not seem practical or
worthwhile, looking back that could have expedited the data acquisition
dramatically.
Finally, the team communication could have improved. Instead of having each
member work on the same aspects of the project, everyone was assigned
individual tasks. While in theory this should increase productivity, there should
have been more time put into working on project parameters and system
interfaces. Instead of simply adding modules to the application, we had to rewrite
much of the interfacing code in order to work with work from other members.
The common theme across all three areas of improvement is planning. After
completing our project, we realize how vital it is to have a good plan. Many of
these issues could be mitigated with smarter planning and research. While some
of these issues could not have been predicted during the planning phase, there
could have been more research done, and more adjustments made along the way.
An open-ended project such as this one requires members to adapt quickly and
create steps and firmware that can be easily adapted for new tests. These skills are
universal in all engineering positions and long-term projects, and we will make
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sure to not repeat our same mistakes in the future.
Section 7.4 - Final Remarks
At the end of the day, our team looks back at this project as a positive, learning
experience. Just compiling this document reminds each of us of our own
individual challenges and contributions for this project. We will never forget the
moment where we discovered the HiLo extraction method and saw our first
high-reliability results. Nothing compares to working on such a large problem and
finally finding a solution that works. Although there were many long nights, hours
of research, hundreds of trials, and maybe a bit of crying here and there, we ended
up developing something we are all proud to call our own.
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APPENDIX A: PROJECT SCHEDULE
While many aspects of the project were difficult to estimate time-wise, we have
an updated schedule in Figure A1. The main setbacks came from ONFI 2.2
firmware development in the Fall quarter, which was originally scheduled to be
completed by November. Unfortunately, the firmware took longer to develop and
test than anticipated, and it leaked into ealy-mid December. Another place where
the schedule slipped was PUF extraction testing. The HiLo method took about 2.5
months to develop (originally scheduled for 1.5 months).
These two main setbacks ultimately forced us to narrow our project goals from
looking at full system implementation down to a PUF extraction technique paired
with a simple proof of concept handshaking protocol. While the full system would
have been interesting to build and test, we simply ran out of time. Although we
still met most of our initial project goals, we did have to sacrifice a few extra
features in order to complete all of our work in time.
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Figure A1: Project Timeline and Completion
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APPENDIX B: PROJECT FIRMWARE INFORMATION
As mentioned previously, the project firmware was written entirely on MBed.
There were no open source drivers for programming ONFI 2.2 chips, so all
drivers had to be written from scratch. This was no easy task, as the interface
specifications require small detail oriented messages. The basic functionalities of
programming pages, erasing blocks, and reading data were all completed for our
STM32 based microcontroller, and the firmware can be found at:
https://os.mbed.com/users/lypinator/code/FlashNANDController/
All connections using this firmware are shown in Figure A1.
Figure B1: Experimental Setup with Firmware Interface
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